NOTES
WAIVERS OF THE LMRDA § 402(b) 60-DAY
TIME LIMIT: WHEN MUST THE SECRETARY
OF LABOR SUE TO SET ASIDE A UNION
ELECTION?
In Hodgson v. International Printing.Pressmen and Assistants'

Union,' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where a union
has agreed not to plead the statutory sixty day time limit, the federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear a complaint to set aside a union
election under section 402(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 2 filed after sixty days by the
Secretary of Labor. The case arose following a general election of
officers held by the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants'
Union (IPPA), on February 21, 1968. Members of three IPPA locals,
after invoking procedures for internal union review, complained to the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 402(a) of the LMRDA 3 that
I. 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT

1959 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY];
Letter from George T. Avery, Associate Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of Labor, to Charlotte Smith,
Nov. 4, 1971, (responding to a Questionnaire), on tile in the Duke Law Journal office
[hereinafter cited as Labor Dep't Response] (quoted by permission);
Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1617 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Election Remedies];
Note, The Election Labyrinth, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 336 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Labyrinth].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970):
The Secretary shall investigate such complaint [filed by a member of a labor organization
with the Secretary of Labor alleging violations of § 401] and, if he finds probable cause
to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied,
he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against
the labor organization . . .to set aside the invalid election ...
3. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970):
A member of a labor organization(I) who has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of
such organization and of any parent body, or
(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision
within three calendar months after their invocation,
may file a complaint with the Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging
the violation of any provision of Section 481 . ...
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF
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the election had violated section 401 of that Act.' The Secretary conducted investigations, and initiated discussions with the international

union for settlement of the complaints. Twice, on June 19, 1968, and
September 19, 1968, the General Counsel of IPPA wrote to the Secre-

tary of Labor agreeing to extend the time limit for the Secretary to
file suit, to September 28, 1968 and November 1,1968, respectively,'
and further agreeing not to plead an expiration of time as a defense

to any such suit.' After discussions failed to resolve the dispute the
Secretary filed an action against the IPPA on October 29, 1968: 135,
132, and 126 days after the individual members' complaints had been
filed. 7 The Secretary pleaded the union waiver in his complaint,' and,

as agreed, the international union did not raise the expiration of time
as a defense.' However, the district court issued, sua sponte, a Memorandum Opinion and Order on December 3, 1969, directing the Secre-

tary to establish that the jurisdiction of the court had not been improperly invoked.' 0 After oral arguments, the district court ruled that it
4. What was the nature of the violations complained of'?
Included in the protests iled with the union and the Secretary were allegations that the
election . . . was not conducted by secret ballot, that there had been a lack of adequate
safeguards to insure a fair election, that notice of the election had not been mailed to
the last known home address of each member at least 15 days prior to the scheduled
election, and that union funds had been expended to promote the candidacies of persons
in the challenged election. Labor Dep't Response (question 2).
5. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Hodgson v. I PPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971); Complaint
I VIII, Wirtz v. IPPA, decidedsub non. Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS. 9 11,759 (E.D.
Tenn., May 7, 1970).
6. It is unclear who initiated these waiver agreements. Complaint f VIIi. Wirtz v. IPPA.
decided sub nora. Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAs. " 11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May 7, 1970),
stated that the union's General Counsel had twice agreed to extensions of the LMRDA's sixty
day time limit. This statement was referred to by the Labor Dep't in response to a question
asking which party in Hodgson had initiated the waiver agreement. Labor Dep't Response I
(question 3). Yet, in the IPPA's brief filed with the Sixth Circuit, Brief for Appellee at 2,
Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971), the union asserted that "The Secretary (of
Labor] had . . . obtained a waiver of the statutory time limit in which to bring suit from the
defendant," suggesting some disagreement over who supplied the impetus for the waiver accord.
The significance of this factual discrepancy lies in the potential reduction of the union's
blameworthiness in connection with the waiver agreement. It is much less compelling from an
equitable standpoint for the IPPA to assert the invalidity of the waiver after having been the
party initiating such an agreement, than it would be for the IPPA to attack the waiver having
merely passively assented to Labor Dep't requests for a waiver of the sixty day time limit.
7. Brief for Appellee at 2, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 197 1).
8. Complaint F VIII, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS. F 11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May 7,
1970).
9. Brief for Appellant at 3, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971).
10. Response of the Secretary of Labor to [District] Court's December 3, 1969 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS. w 11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May
7, 1970).
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was without jurisdiction because "the commencement of [the] action
within [the sixty day] time of limitation is a condition precedent to
bringing the action," and since the failure of jurisdiction could not
be waived by consent or other action of the parties, a court must
decline to proceed where it lacks such jurisdiction." The district court
found no congressional intention that the sixty day limitation was to
be extended in the context of this action.12 The Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding that there was federal court jurisdiction, and it vacated and
remanded for further proceedings. 3 The petition to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari, filed by IPPA on the question of
whether the time limit of section 402(b) of the LMRDA is ajurisdictional provision, 4 was denied. 5
To insure democratic control of union affairs, the LMRDA sets
forth specific requirements for unions and remedies for aggrieved
union members. Title IV of the LMRDA 6 provides that national or
international union officers must be elected at least every five years,
local officers every three, and officers of intermediate bodies every
four years, by secret ballot. A union must have safeguards for fair
elections such as pollwatching, access to membership lists for each
candidate, and union distribution of each candidate's literature. Each
union member in good standing must be given a reasonable opportunity to become, support, or vote for a candidate. Fifteen days notice
of elections must be given and ballots must be kept for one year with
the votes published and counted separately by locals. Further, unions
are prohibited from spending funds to promote any one candidate.
For enforcement of Title IV, the Act provides that a member of a
local union, who has exhausted internal remedies or has not obtained
a final union decision within three months after invoking union grievance procedures, may file, within one month thereafter, a complaint
of violation of Title IV, with the Secretary of Labor. 7 The Secretary
is required to investigate and file suit against the labor organization
within sixty days if he finds probable cause to believe a violation of
1I. Shultzv. IPPA. 65 CCH

LAB. CAS. 1" 11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May 7, 1970).
12. Id. at 21,377.
13. 440 F.2d at 1119.
14. Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 1-2, Hodgson v. I PPA, 40 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1971).
15. 40 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
16. LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
17. See note 3 supra for the text of the applicable LMRDA provision, 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)
(1970). See also Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 464 (1968).
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Title IV has occurred and has not been remedied. If the court, after
trial, does find violations of the election procedures, it shall declare
the election void and direct a new one under the Secretary's supervi-

sion. "' Section 403 of the LMRDA provides that any existing rights
and remedies to enforce the constitution and by-laws of a labor organ-

ization prior to an election remain, but that Title IV is the exclusive
remedy for challenges made after an election is held.' After a member
has filed a complaint, he may not intervene should the Secretary file
a civil suit. 20 If the Secretary of Labor does not bring suit, the complaining member may not sue the union himself,2 ' nor may he compel

the Secretary to file such an action. 22 Moreover, the courts will generally refuse to review the Secretary's decision because it is deemed

discretionary.?- However, should the Secretary find probable cause to
18. LMRDA § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1970).
19. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970). See also Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134
(1964); Wirtz v. Local 611, I BEW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2423 (D.N.M. 1966). Title I of the Act appears
to leave some rights to enforcement by the individual. The guarantees of equal rights to nominate and to vote provided by Title I seem to overlap with the election provisions of Title IV,
and some violations might conceivably fall under both sections. In Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S.
134 (1964), the Supreme Court considered such a violation. Union members sued to enjoin their
union from holding an election on the grounds that the national union's constitution and bylaws infringed upon the right of members to nominate candidates, which is guaranteed by
§ 101(a)(1) of the LMRDA. 379 U.S. at 135. The provisions were such that members could
only nominate themselves, and candidates had to have been union members for five years and
at sea for 180 days each in two of the three preceding years, on vessels covered by union
contracts. Title I of the LMRDA of 1959 does protect the equal rights to nominate candidates,
and Title IV requires that a reasonable opportunity be given for the nomination of candidates
and that every member in good standing be eligible to become a candidate, subject to reasonable
qualifications for office. The Supreme Court ruled that its jurisdiction in Calhoon v. Harvey
depended on section 101 of the Act and that the union members there could not rely in whole
or in part on a violation of section 401. Title I was interpreted to require an element of
discrimination deemed absent in that case. Since Title IV had its own standards of candidate
eligibility, and its own enforcement administration by the Secretary of Labor, it could not be
used to provide jurisdiction for an individual suit.
As a result of Harvey, the importance of the Secretary's title IV civil action in attaining
union democracy-apparent on the face of the statute and in the legislative history-is
magnified. Pre-election relief under title I is very limited; and resort to state courts for
pre-election relief is available only in connection with rights conferred on members by
the union constitution.
Beaird, Union Officer Election Provisionsof the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 51 VA. L. REV. 1306, 1325-26 (1965). See also Election Remedies 1621-23.
20. Stein v. Wirtz, 366 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967); Wirtz
v. Local 1377, IBEW, 67 L.R.R.M. 2938 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Wirtz v. Local 12, IUOP, 66
L.R.R.M. 2080 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
21. McGuire v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 426 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1970).
22. Altman v. Wirtz, 56 L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964).
23. McArthy v. Wirtz, 65 L.R.R.M. 2411, 2413 (D. Mo. 1967); Altman v. Wirtz, 56
L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964).
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believe a LMRDA violation was committed, a court may review his
decision not to file suit, to the extent of determining whether or not
he has abused his discretion. 24 In order to make such a determination,
the court may order the Secretary to provide it with a more detailed
explanation for his refusal to file suit.25
Between 1959 and 1966, the Department of Labor processed some
1300 union election complaints under the LMRDA with roughly 110
resulting in litigation, 840 considered not actionable, and about 240
settled through voluntary compliance.26 During fiscal year 1971, 132
such complaints were filed. 27 A union member may make his complaint to one of the regional offices of the Department of Labor's
Labor-Management Services Administration (LMSA), or to the Office of Labor-Management and Welfare Pension Reports (LMWP)
in Washington, D.C. 28 The Department of Labor has apparently not
published specific procedures for filing such a complaint in the Code
of Federal Regulations; what is printed in the Code is largely a paraphrase of the statute. 29 No guidelines discussing how the Department
determines the sufficiency of a complaint, ascertains probable cause,
or accepts voluntary compliance, etc. are readily available, with a
consequent burden thus placed upon the complainant in filing with,
or the union in arguing against, the Department of Labor.3 1 If the
Labor Department's regional director feels the claim is frivolous, he
may dismiss it; if not, it is investigated and forwarded with a recommendation to Washington, D.C., where it may be dismissed as frivolous, untimely, or for failing to exhaust internal union remedies. If
a basis to the complaint is determined, there will be further investigation, with notice of this development to both international or national
union and local. 3 1 Solutions short of litigation for the Department of
Labor might entail requesting a re-run of the contested election, with
or without Labor Department supervision; holding of the next scheduled election, with or without Labor Department supervision; or
24. DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682 (D.D.C. 1969); Schonfield v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp.
705 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
25. DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969).
26. Labyrinth 351, 369. In 1967 the Dep't of Labor's Annual Reports ceased including
statistics on LMRDA actions.
27. Labor Dep't Response 4 (question 3).
28. Id. at 3 (questions I & 2).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 452 (1971).
30. For a discussion of this lack of specific Labor Dep't standards, see Labyrinth 382-83.
3 1. Election Remedies 1632.
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amending the union's constitution and by-laws.1 2 The Department
obviously places much emphasis on bargaining with the allegedly
offending union, with a view toward voluntary compliance. 3 Waivers
of section 402(b)'s sixty day time limit are routinely sought as a
precaution against a union's later reneging on an agreement stipulating its voluntary compliance with a Labor Department directive. 4 An
affidavit by the (then) Acting Director of the Office of Labor-Management and Welfare Pension Reports filed with the district court in
Shultz v. IPPA stated that in 175 of the 329 investigations conducted
by the LMWP between 1962 and 1968, which disclosed actionable
union elections violations, the Secretary of Labor withheld filing suit
after receiving an agreement extending the time limit under section
402(b).1 As of January 1, 1971, approximately 30 percent of the
union election complaint cases handled by the Labor Department
involved waiver agreements.3 6 By judicial and administrative interpretation, a suit need not be instituted unless the Department feels there
is probable cause to believe the outcome of the election has been
affected.3 7 The disposition of the complaint may or may not be coinmunicated to the complainant; if so, it is often by a letter of determi32. Id.; Labyrinth 374 n.235.
33. See Response of Secretary of Labor to [District] Court's December 3, 1969 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 6-7, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAs. 4 11,759 (E.D. Tenn.,
May 7, 1970); Holcombe, Union Democracy and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 12 LAB. L.J. 597, 602 (1961); Petters & Humphrey, Labor-Management Reporting
and DisclosureAct of 1959, J. OF WO EN LAWYERS, Aug. 1961, at 13; Election Remedies 1632.
34. Response of the Secretary of Labor to [District] Court's December 3, 1969 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS. r 11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May
7, 1970).
35. Id. at 2.
36. Labor Dep't Response 8 (question 19). According to the Department of Labor:
In most cases it is the union representatives who offer an agreement to extend the time
within which suit may be filed in order to permit them and their organizations to review
the election once more particularly in light of the investigative findings of the Department. In some cases, however, the Department of Labor representatives may request that
a waiver be given in those situations where the election investigation is quite complex
and additional time is needed to complete the investigation. In either event the primary
purpose of the waiver agreement is to permit the parties to discuss the findings with
regard to the challenged election and to work out a voluntary settlement agreement
whereby the violations are corrected. Id. at 4 (question 5).
While the average duration of these waiver agreements seems to be about 30 days (the waiver
in Hodgson was for two successive 60-day periods), at least one such extension of the section
402(b) time limit has been for a period in excess of 18 months. Id. at 4-5 (question 7).
37. See Altman v. Wirtz, 56 L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964); 29 C.F.R. § 452.16(b) (1971).
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nation from the Director of LMWP, which is also placed on public
file at the regional offices."
In addition to regulating union elections, the LMRDA of 1959
protects the rights of union members, requires the filing of certain
financial reports with the Secretary of Labor, and provides for other
diverse regulation of labor organizations." Pressure for such a labor
reform bill came from public revelations of corruption and undemocratic practices in the labor movement, as reported by the United
States Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the LaborManagement Field-the McClellan Committee. 0 An attempt was
made to pass a reform bill in 1958, but, although one passed the
Senate by a vote of 88 to 1,41 it was defeated in the House. 42 The bill
which passed the Senate was essentially the one introduced by Senator
John Kennedy, and its section comparable to Section 402(b) of the
LMRDA required that the Labor Secretary bring suit to set aside a
43
suspect union election within thirty days of receiving a complaint.
During the course of the Senate debate, Senator Smith of New Jersey
felt that thirty days was an insufficient time limitation, and submitted
an amendment reading, "or as soon thereafter as possible. ' 44 Senators Smith and Kennedy agreed to a compromise reading "within 30
' 45
days or as soon thereafter as possible but in no event after 60 days.
It was in that form that the 1958 bill passed the Senate. In 1959, the
principal bill introduced into the Senate forming the nucleus for the
LMRDA was the Kennedy-Ives bill, but this time it contained the
wording of the present statute, requiring of the Secretary that "he
shall file suit within 60 days. ' 46 In considering the Senate bill, the
38. See Labyrinth 369-70, which states that of over 1000 determined cases, only 151 letters
of determination were on ile with the Dep't of Labor's New York regional office, although
indications are that the unions actually receive a greater number of these letters. See note 24
supra for an indication of some problem with letters of determination.
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
40. Cox, InternalAffairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Ac! of 1959, 58 MICH.
L. REv. 819, 820 (1960).
41. 104 CONG. REC. 11487 (1958).
42. Id. at 18288.
43. See id. at 7953-55, for the introduction of the Kennedy bill, S. 3751, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958). The final bill reaching the floor of the Senate after committee consideration, S.
3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), is discussed at 104 CONG. REC. 11003 (1958), where some
of the Kennedy bill provisions are mentioned.
44. 104 CONG. REC. 11003 (1958) (amendment no. 4).

45. Id. at 11182.
46. 105 CONG. REC. 883-94 (1959) (S.505, as referred to the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare). Note that the committee bill, cited in text accompanying note 52, infra, was
numbered S. 1555.
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House struck out the Senate bill's election enforcement section and
provided instead for enforcement by civil actions to be filed by individual labor organization members aggrieved by election violations,
who had either exhausted reasonable union remedies or had pursued
the available remedies without receiving a final decision within six
calendar months. 7 The Conference Committee adopted the Senate
version. 8 Both the Senate49 and the House5 ° agreed to the version
submitted by the Conference Committee.
Various congressional expressions were made concerning both the
general legislative purpose and specifically who the LMRDA of 1959
was to protect. 5' One view was that the Act was aimed at protecting
union members. Senator McClellan shared this view when he argued
for the adoption of his Title I "Bill of Rights" amendment saying: "S.
1555 [the Committee bill] does not adequately meet the needs of union
members for the protection of their 'rights.' ' s2 Representatives Landrum and Griffin stated that prompt action should be taken if Americans, especially the working men and women, were to be protected. 3
Also persuasive, that there were those in Congress intending the bill
to protect individual union members, was the fact that the original
House bill provided for enforcement by private suits.54
Another view, and the one stressed by the Hodgson court, was that
the LMRDA had a countervailing purpose to promote internal union
democracy without undue government interference in union operations.5 5 One of the principles the Senate committee said it had fol47. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., IstSess. 43 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 801.

48. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 935.
49. 105 CONG. REC. 17919 (1959).
50. Id. at 18154.
51.See generally Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEo. L.J. 226 (1959);
O'Donoghue, The Bill ofRights-Rights-Responsibilitiesof Its Beneficiaries,48 G~o. L.J. 257
(1959); Note, Survey of the United States Supreme Court Decisions Affecting LaborManagement Relations During the 1967-68 Term, 47 N.C.L. REv. 861 (1969).
52. 105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959).
53. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., IstSess. 99 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 857.

54. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
55. See Holcombe, Union Democracy and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 12 LAB. L.J. 597 (1961); Karro, Administrative Interpretation of the LaborManagement Reporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, WIS. BAR BULL. Oct. 1960, at 38; Klciler,
The Impact of Titles -IVofthe Landrum-Griffin Act, 3 GA. L. REV. 378 (1969); St. Antoine,
Landrum-Griffin, 1965-66:A Calculus of Democratic Values, 19 N.Y. CoNF. LABOR 35 (1966).
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lowed was:
the desirability of minimum interference by Government in the internal affairs
of any private organization. . . .Moreover, . . . great care should be taken
not to undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as
collective bargaining agents.55

The Sixth Circuit placed much weight on the fact that, as it stated:
In discussing the bill, its principalsponsor,Senator Kennedy said, 'The important thing is to get the democratic procedure and then to let the union run its
own internal affairs in keeping with that democratic procedure, with the policing surveillance which the Kennedy bill, 57with respect to this matter and other
matters, gave to the Secretary of Labor.'

There is a strong possibility that the court incorrectly attributed this

statement. These exact words appear under Senator Wayne Morse's
name in the Congressional Record for September 3, 1959,11 and also
are reprinted under Senator Morse's name in the United States Department of Labor's Legislative History of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Titles I-IV. 9 Far from being
the principal sponsor, Senator Morse was one of but two "nay" votes
cast in the Senate in opposition to the LMRDA, which was passed
by the margin of 95-2!" ° And among the reasons Senator Morse opposed the LMRDA, was his belief that the Act did not clearly represent the objectives described in his statement above. 6 Since the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Hodgson failed to provide a citation
reference for their "Kennedy" quote, it is impossible to ascertain
whether the court did have some source listing Senator John F.
Kennedy as the author of the statement.12 Since the Sixth Circuit
considered the legislative history of the LMRDA most important in
Sess. 7 (1959), reprintedin I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
56. S.REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist
403.
57. 440 F.2d at 1117 (emphasis added). The court failed to indicate the source of this
quotation.
58. 105 CONG. REC. 17872 (1959) (middle column). Senator Morse's name appears at id.
at 17871.
59. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, TITLES [-IV 833 (1964).
60. 105 CONG. REC. 17919-20 (1959).
61. See. e.g., id. at 17859 (left column).
62. Even if the Sixth Circuit did possess some unknown source for their "Kennedy" quote,
the Senator made several statements concerning the LMRDA which strongly supported government activism in combatting labor union corruption. Regarding the Kennedy-Ives bill of 1958,
a joint press release by the co-sponsors declared:
2. The administration bill contains a weak and ineffective provision concerning election
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deciding Hodgson v. IPPA ,3 a mistaken reliance on a quote incorrectly attributed to the "principal sponsor" of the Act would severely
undermine the basis for the Hodgson decision.

The Supreme Court in its decision in Calhoon v. Harvey found
that "the general congressional policy [underlying the LMRDA] was

to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies." 4 The Court has also identified a third object of the Act's
protection: the American public. "[The provisions of section 401 are]

necessary protections of the public interest as well of union members." 6 5 This view has been echoed by a commentator who stated that

it was a congressional choice "that democratic principles must be the
standard by which the unions govern themselves.""6

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered Hodgson a close
case of first impression.67 It was argued by the Secretary of Labor that

the established practice of the Deiartment of routinely seeking
waivers of the sixty day time limit should not be upset, that a statute
of limitations was an affirmative defense not susceptible of sua sponte

judicial treatment when not pleaded by the defendant, and, in any
event, the LMRDA's statutory time limit should not be regarded as

jurisdictional.

8

In opposing the Secretary's position, the IPPA

procedures of unions ...
The Kennedy-Ives bill authorizes the Secretary of Labor to bring court action to set
aside elections not held in secret and not in compliance with the union's constitution.
104 CONG. REC. 10658 (1958).
Senator Kennedy later characterized his 1958 bill as:
based on the principle that even though commendable efforts to strengthen internal
controls have been made by trade unionists, many situations cannot be reached by the
machinery which has been established by the trade union movement. The bill recognizes,
therefore, the necessity of applying the coercive power of Government to the correction
of some of the most serious abuses which have come to the attention of the Congress.
104 CONG. REC. 10944 (1958) (left column).
Upon the introduction of his bill in 1959, Senator Kennedy noted that "[t]his bill is stronger
and clearer than the 1958 version. . . .This is a strong, effective reform bill." 105 CoNG. REc.
884 (1959).
63. 440 F.2d at 1119.
64. 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964). Accord, Hodgson v. Local 6799, USWA, 403 U.S. 333, 338
(1971); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 471 (1968).
65. Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers' Int'l Union, 389 U.S. 477, 483 (1968), quoted in Wirtz
v. Local 6, Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, 391 U.S. 492,497 (1968).
66. Beaird, 51 VA. L. REV., supra note 19, at 1307.
67. Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d at 1113, I115.
68. Further, the Secretary pointed to courts which did not regard the time limit as jurisdictional where the union had obstructed the Secretary's investigation, thus delaying the iling of
the suit. Brief for Appellant at 22-23 n.7, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d I 113 (6th Cir. 1971).
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argued that the language of section 402(b) of the LMRDA, in view
of its legislative history, was mandatory, and should be strictly construed. The district court had certainly interpreted the Act's legislative history to render its language mandatory, and, in addition, had
relied upon the principle that adherence to section 402(b)'s time limitation was a condition precedent to the Secretary's bringing suit.69
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit noted that the district
court's "condition precedent" interpretation came from a Supreme
70 While The Harrisburg,standing
Court decision: The Harrisburg.
alone, supported the district judge, the court of appeals thought it
important to examine two more recent high court decisions: Burnett
v. New York Central Railroad,7' and Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal.7 Both cases arose under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), which contains a three year statute of limitations. 3 Burnett held that a filing in a state court, which was dismissed
for improper venue and not transferable to the proper court because
of state law, was sufficient to toll the FELA time limit. 74 In Glus, the

petitioner argued that the respondent was estopped to raise the defense
of untimeliness because he had misled the petitioner into believing he
(petitioner) had seven years to sue. The Court there rejected respondent's argument that, because the time limitation was integral to the
FELA, estoppel was unavailable. Instead, the Court found nothing in
the language or history of the FELA to indicate that the principle,
that no man may take advantage of his own wrong, should not be
applied. 75 The circuit court in Hodgson paid special attention to a
footnote in Glus which quoted from The Harrisburgthat "[n]o question arises in this case [The Harrisburg]as to the power of a court of
admiralty to allow an equitable excuse for delay in suing, because no
excuse of any kind has been shown.

'7

This statement indicated The

Harrisburgwas not comparable to the Hodgson case since the former
had not had occasion to consider equitable grounds for tolling a
statutory time limitation. The Hodgson court relied heavily on that
Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS. " 11,759, at 21,375 (E.D. Tenn., May 7, 1970).
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
380 U.S. 424 (1965).
359 U.S. 231 (1959).
45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
74. 380 U.S. at 436.
75. 359 U.S. at 232-35, rejecting as dicta cases making "an exception to the doctrine of
estoppel" in actions similar to petitioner's, in Glus.
76. Id. at 234 n.I 1, quoting The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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portion of the Glus decision which reaffirmed that the maxim that no
man may take advantage of his own wrong is deeply rooted, and has
been frequently used "to bar inequitable reliance on statutes of limitations. ' 77 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found support in Burnett
for its approach of reliance upon congressional intentions underlying
the LMRDA of 1959 .7 Burnett outlined a method for determining if
the congressional intent permitted tolling of time limitations, by examining "the purposes and policies underlying the limitation provision, the [a]ct itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the en'7
forcement of the rights given by the [a]ct." 9
Since the Sixth Circuit in Hodgson determined from both Ghts
and Burnett that the proper approach was to examine congressional
intent, it studied the legislative history of the LMRDA. The court first
examined the statutory language, tracing changes in what eventually
became section 402(b), from a time limitation of "30 days," to "30
days or as soon thereafter as possible" with the addition of "but in
no event after 60 days," and finally to simply "within 60 days,""1 the
present wording of the section. The court felt that, while it was clear
Congress was concerned that the Secretary of Labor act promptly,
there was no record of Congress considering when section 402(b)
would be subject to being tolled by equitable defenses. The Sixth
Circuit did note, however, that more emphatic language was not
adopted. Acknowledging the inclusiveness of the legislative history,
the court turned to an examination of general purposes, and suggested
that the statute "sprang from congressional concern for protecting
the right of union members to democratic procedures within their
77. Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d at I115, quoting Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359
U.S. 231, 233 (1959). See also Shroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334 (1896), where a purchaser who
told a debtor the limitation would not be pleaded was estopped to later resort to the statute.
78. "[T]he basic inquiry is whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the
statute of limitations in given circumstances," Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d at 1116, quoting
front Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,427 (1965).
79. Id. This method was applied in Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania Railway,
320 U.S. 356 (1943), wherein recovery of freight charges was sought under the Interstate
Commerce Act § 16(3)(a), 49 U.S.C. § 16(3)(a) (1970), which provided a three year limit for
the riling of such an action. Three days before the end of the statutory period, an agreement
was made at the company's request that the company would refrain from pleading the statute
of limitations if the railway would not sue for a specified period. In order to further the
congressional purpose of uniform treatment of all shippers and carriers, the Court in Midstate
concluded that such a waiver agreement did not toll the statute of limitations. 320 U.S. at 367.
80. 440 F.2d at II16. For a full discussion of this legislative history see text accompanying
notes 43-50 supra.
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labor organizations."'8 However, the court noted a "countervailing
desire to allow unions to put their own houses in order whenever they
could and would do so"2 and relied upon the Labor Department's

administrative practice of resorting primarily to negotiation with the
violating unions to effect voluntary compliance. 83

Other court decisions seemed to provide illustrations of a retention
of jurisdiction where the statutory time limit in the LMRDA had
passed, although the court in Hodgson admitted none of these cases

were controlling. Still, all but one case supported the Secretary's
view, '" and the Sixth Circuit thought it significant that, up until

Hodgson, apparently no judge or litigant had seriously objected to the
waiver process. The court also pointed to a case8 5 where filing of a

suit on the sixty-first day was held timely, because the sixtieth day was
a Sunday, as supporting flexibility in application of the section 402(b)
time bar, although the Sixth Circuit recognized the case as dealing

strictly with an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(a). 86 Finally, the Hodgson panel cited a series of cases, 87 where the

section 402(b) time limit was tolled as a result of union obstruction
of Labor Department investigations, as supporting the view that the
sixty day limitation was subject to equitable defenses. The court concluded that:
[w]here a statute (as here) gives jurisdiction. . . and sets a time limit for filing,
the tolling of that time limit automatically extends the jurisdiction of the court.
The basic question is whether in view of the congressional purpose any equitable considerations should be allowed to toll the limitations ....

[W]e believe that the congressional intent and purpose in enactment of Title
IV is best served by holding that the waiver of the 60-day time limit and the
81. 440 F.2d at 1117.
82. Id.

83. Id. The court gave some, although not conclusive, weight to the administrative interpretation, following Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), which had held that deference is to be
given to an administrative interpretation of a statute, and that, so long as the interpretation is
reasonable, it can be upheld despite the fact a court might have chosen a different result had it
had the opportunity to decide the issue initially.
84. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 110-18 infra.
85. Wirtz v. Peninsula Shipbuilders Ass'n, 382 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1967).
86. "Incomputing any period of time prescribed ...

by any applicable statute ... [tihe

last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday." FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a). The court in Wirtz, in dicta,
interpreted the section 402(a) time limit to be directory rather than mandatory. 382 F.2d at 240.
87. See notes 116-18 infra and accompanying text.
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reliance thereon tolled the time limitations and acted to estop its assertion by
appellee [IPPA] ....
[W]e believe this view accords with the intent of Congress, since the 60-day time limitation which was waived by appellee was
principally intended by Congress as a protection for the very party which
executed the waivers.m

As a general rule, statutory provisions limiting the time in which
a suit may be filed have the dual purposes of fostering fairness to a
defendant by allowing him to be secure from stale claims and of
relieving the courts of insignificant and tenuous suits'" A distinction
has traditionally been made between general statutes of limitations
which apply to a variety of actions, and special, or creative statutes
of limitations which apply to only one type of suit. These creative

statutes are ones which create a right of action not existing at common law, and usually contain both the time limit and an authorization
for the right of action in the same statute."' The expiration of the time
limit was said to terminate the right as well as the remedy,' and such

a bar was held to be absolute, not subject to tolling by equitable
considerations or express waiver.12 In contrast, general statutes of
limitations, when expired, were held to extinguish only the remedy 3
and such statutes were subject to tolling by both equitable considerations and express waiver. 4 The difference between the two types of
statutes was once described by terming general statutes "procedural"

and creative statutes "substantive." However, the Supreme Court
called this kind of substantive/procedural distinction worthless in
determining when the limitation period may be extended.9 5 Indeed, the

judicial trend is to seek to soften the harsh results of even so-called
creative statutes of limitations by tolling them on equitable grounds."
88. Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d at 1119.
89. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1964); Developments in the Law,
Statutes of Limitations,63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1185-86 (1950).
90. Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania Ry., 320 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1943).
91. Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F.2d 940, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1950).
92. Midsiate, 320 U.S. at 359.
93. Id. at 359.
94. United States v. Price-McNemar Const. Co., 320 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1963).
95. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 426-27.
96. Belton v. Traynor, 381 F.2d 82, 86 (4th Cir. 1967); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225
F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955). This "modern interpretation," as th6 Hodgson court called it, 440
F.2d at 1119, is not all that conclusive. Compare United States ex rel. Moritz v. Merle A.
Patnode Co., 323 F. Supp. 166, 167 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (one year time limit of Miller Act, 40
U.S.C. § 270b(b) "can be waived") with Martin v. Grace Line, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 395, 396
(E.D. Cal. 1970) ("statutes of limitations fixed by Congress may not be lengthened by estoppel
or waiver by agents of the United States") and St. Paul Nat'l Bank v. United States, 320 F.
Supp. 1066, 1069 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (26 U.S.C. § 6532(c) time limit for non-taxpayers to sue
the Government "is a substantive jurisdictional requirement which must be met").
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This tendency is apparent in the tone of Midstate Horticultural Co.
v. Pennsylvania Railway,97 if not in its holding, for, instead of automatically regarding the statute, there clearly a creative statute of
limitations, as barring suit, the Supreme Court examined the intention of Congress, the judicial decisions regarding the time limitation,
and the regulatory scheme developed by Congress.9"
Several other federal statutes beside the LMRDA of 1959 have

time limits within their own provisions capable of being classified as
creative statutes of limitations. Under the approach of Midstate,
some of them have been found to be tolled by equitable corisiderations

and express waiver.99 In other cases, courts have determined from a
review of the pertinent congressional intents and purposes that the
subject statute may not be tolled by a particular equitable defense.100
The limitation involved in the LMRDA is unusual because, rather

than limiting the time within which a private individual must sue, it
limits a federal government agency, in this case the Secretary of
Labor. A few other statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, have similar provisions. Title VII provides that:
if within thirty days after a charge is filed with the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission (EEOC)... ... .. such period may be extended to not
more than sixty days upon a determination by the Commission that further
efforts to secure voluntary compliance are warranted), the Commission has
been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this subchapter, the Commis97. 320 U.S. 356 (1943).
98. Id. at 360-61.
99. Clayton Act §§ 4B, 5(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15b, l6b (1970): Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964); Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec.
Co., 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962) (time limit within which individuals may file antitrust suits
after government criminal suits, is tolled by "fraudulent concealment"); Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 913 (1970): Belton v. Traynor, 381
F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1967) (representation by former deputy commissioner to injured longshoreman
that he had received all compensation entitled longshoreman to an extended limitations period);
Federal Employers Liability Act § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970): Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959); Long v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 355 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1966)
(reliance on misleading statements by claim agent may estop company from pleading expiration
of time); Suits in Admiralty Act § 5, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1970): Northern Metal Co. v. United
States, 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965) (time tolled while certain required administrative steps are
taken); Trading with the Enemy Act § 34(f), 50 U.S.C. App. § 34(f): Honda v. Clark, 386
U.S. 484 (1967) (persons not filing suit within sixty days to contest distribution of seized
Japanese bank assets, but bringing such an action immediately after disposition of another suit
challenging the rate of exchange, not barred, and the time limit is extended).
100. Interstate Commerce Act § 20(11), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970): Burns v. Chicago,
M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 192 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1951) (negotiations and correspondence do not
toll time limit for filing suit for lost goods).
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sion shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty
days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge
.0I

Two periods of limitation appear within this statute. The EEOC has
thirty (or sixty) days to notify the person aggrieved if voluntary compliance has not been achieved. This is a limit upon the agency charged
with seeking compliance for the benefit of a complainant, as is the
LMRDA upon the Department of Labor. The Civil Rights Act time
limit, however, is not considered mandatory, and a subsequent suit by
an individual will not be dismissed if the Commission took more than
sixty days to investigate and seek voluntary compliance.""2 However,
the EEOC has provided in its administrative procedures that either
the complainant or the respondent may demand in writing that the
notification of the Commission's inability to gain voluntary compliance be given to the complainant after sixty days from the filing of
his complaint. 0 3 Once the complaining party receives this notice from
the EEOC, he may bring suit against the respondent within thirty
days. ' 4 Although the LMRDA provides for suit by the Secretary of
Labor instead of by an individual, it may be valuable to compare the
interpretation of these two statutory time limits, for both permit suits
to be instituted after periods of agency investigation and efforts towards voluntary compliance. Where no equitable considerations appear, the time limit for individuals filing suit under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has been strictly applied.' Failure to sue within thirty
days is held to be a jurisdictional defect despite a delay in receiving
notice because of a complainant's illness;" 6 and despite a request, as
provided for by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, " for an appointed
attorney when the EEOC had advised complainant it had found no
probable cause for a finding of discrimination.'"6 An individual's request for counsel where the Commission has found probable cause
101. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
102. Cunningham v. Litton Ind., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969).
103. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a (1971). No similar procedure appears to be available in the
Dep't of Labor.
104. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
105. Goodman v. City Prods. Corp., 425 F.2d 702 (6th Cir, 1970). Cf McCarty v. Boeing
Co., 321 F. Supp. 260, 261 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (90-day time limit to ile complaint with the
EEOC under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970) to be "strictly followed").
106. Green v. Ford Motor Co., 59 CCH LAB. CAS. ' 9220 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
107. § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
108. Davis v. Boeing Co., 60 CCH LAB. CAs. " 9312 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
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does, however, fulfill the requirement of filing within thirty days.,0 9
In discussing the effect to be given to the sixty day limitation of
the LMRDA, the Sixth Circuit supported its decision by citing nine
cases where the Act's time limit had elapsed before the Secretary
commenced action, yet which were not dismissed by the courts."'
These cases involved situations where labor union obstruction of the
Secretary's investigation was said to toll the time limit, and cases
where a suit was held timely filed on the sixty-first day because the
sixtieth day was a Sunday. But in three of the cases"' there was no
judicial mention of the waiver at all; rather, it was apparent only from
the facts that commencement of action had been delayed beyond sixty
days. In four of the other cases, the courts, while specifically mentioning that the unions involved had agreed to waivers of the time limit,
failed to explore, or even to consider the effect the waiver had on
federal court jurisdiction."' In one case,' 3 a district court did specifically relate the fact of waiver to the timeliness of suit by saying: "This
action was timely filed on May 7, 1964 by reason of the waiver of the
time requirements of the Act by the defendant and International
Union."" 4 Certainly the cases upon which both the Secretary and the
109. Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 62 CCH LAB. CAS. ' 9408 (E.D. Va. 1970);
McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastic Co., 302 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Tex. 1969) (characterizing court and
attorney delays encountered as equitable considerations). An interesting question apparently not
reached by the courts is whether the time limitation is fulfilled by a complainant's petition for
counsel (assuming an EEOC finding of probable cause) which is rejected, and, if not, for what
period the thirty day time limit is tolled. See Cabot, The Timeliness Question in Bringing Suit
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 22 LAB. L.J. 342 (197 1).
110. Shultz v. Local 1299, USW, 324 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Wirtz v. Local I,
Independent Petroleum Workers, 307 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Shultz v. Local 6799,
USW, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted
sub non. Hodgson v. Local 6799, USW, 400 U.S. 940 (1971); Schultz [sic] v. Local 1470,
IBEW, Civil No. 44-69 (D.N.J., April 28, 1969); Wirtz v. Local 57, IUOE, 298 F. Supp. 89
(D.R.I. 1968); Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 399 F.2d
544 (2d Cir. 1968); Wirtz v. Lodge 872, Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 279 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Pa.
1967); Wirtz v. Local 545, IUOE, 64 L.R.R.M. 2449 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 381 F.2d 448
(2d Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Local 1377, IBEW, 63 L.R.R.M. 2029 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
Ill. Wirtz v. Local 57, IUOE, 293 F. Supp. 89 (D.R.I. 1968); Wirtz v. Lodge 872, Bhd.
of R.R. Trainmen, 279 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Wirtz v. Local 1377, IBEW, 63
L.R.R.M. 2029 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
112. Shultz v. Local 1299, USW, 324 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Shultzv. Local 6799,
USW, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970); Wirtz v. Local
I, Independent Petroleum Workers, 307 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Wirtz v. Nat'l Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without mention of waiver, 399 F.2d 544 (2d
Cir. 1968).
113. Wirtz v. Local 545, IUOE, 64 L.R.R.M. 2449 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 381 F.2d 448
(2d Cir. 1967).
114. 64 L.R.R.M. at 2456.
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Hodgson court relied do not offer compelling support for their position. However, except for the one unreported case,"' there are apparently no cases contrary to their view.
The decisions that tolled the limitation period where unions had
interfered with the Secretary's investigations"' involved union refusal
to furnish requested records, or to comply with a subpoena until the
Secretary of Labor sought an order to enforce the subpoena,"' or until
the order to enforce was actually issued."" While these cases tend to
support the Sixth Circuit's position in Hodgson that the time limit
of the LMRDA is not automatically applied, overt and willful misconduct presents, of course, a different set of circumstances from
where the question is a waiver agreement. Whether the statute is to
be tolled because of the waiver is dependent upon an independent
analysis.
Finally, the court of appeals in Hodgson relied upon Wirtz v.
PeninsulaShipbuildersAssociation"' to illustrate that the LMRDA's
sixty day limit was not an absolute. A one day delay was there excused
115. Shultz v. Local 851, IA M, Civil No. 7C 1579 (unreported) (Oct. 29, 1970), argued and
taken under advisemtent, Civil No. 71-1107 (7th Cir., Oct. 6, 1971).
116. Wirtz v. Local 1622, United Bhd. or Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1968);
Wirtzv. Independent Workers Union, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104 (M.D. Fla. 1967); Wirtzv. Local 705,
Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, 63 L.R.R.M 2315 (E.D. Mich. 1966), order to vacate
on other grounds rev'd, 389 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968); Wirtz v.
Local 47, Int'l Masters, Mates and Pilots, 240 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
In response to the question:
What remedies are available to the Secretary of Labor when confronted with harrassment
or hindrance during an investigation of intra-union election complaints?
the Labor Department stated:
If, during an election investigation, a labor organization refuses to produce election
records, thereby hindering our investigation, suit may be filed under section 601(b) of
the LM RDA to compel production of these records. See Local 57, Operating Engineers
v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 552 (C.A. I, 1965); Wirtz v. Local 191, InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters, 321 F.2d 445 (C.A. 2, 1963) ...
In addition, Section III of Title 18, United States Code, provides criminal sanctions in
those situations where a Labor Department investigator is assaulted while performing
investigative, inspection or law enforcement functions. See also 18 U.S.C. 1114 as
amended by Section 17(h) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Labor
Dep't Response 7 (question 15).
117. Wirtz v. Local 47, Int'l Masters, Mates and Pilots, 240 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
118. Wirtz v. Local 1622, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1968);
Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104 (M.D. Fla. 1967); Wirtzv. Local 705,
Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, 63 L.R.R.M. 2315 (E.D. Mich. 1966), order to vacate
on othergrounds rev'd, 389 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,393 U.S. 832 (1968).
119. 382 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1967).
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by the method of computation provided in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(a), because the sixtieth day fell on Sunday. Applying the
federal procedural rule was deemed consistent with the purposes of the
Act, which had been enacted after the Rules of Civil Procedure, because the limit was felt not to have been written in the terms of a
mandatory statute of limitations; 120 because the Act itself incorporated an imprecise reference to time in section 402121 and because
allowing suit would vindicate the LMRDA's purpose to protect a
union member's rights.
The essence of the conflict in Hodgson is whether the sixty day
time limit of section 402(b) of the LMRDA, within which the Labor
Secretary must file suit, may be tolled by the equitable consideration
of a union's having agreed to a specific extension of the limitation
period.'22 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit properly chose
the accepted analytical approach of examining legislative intent, policies, and purposes. 12 The court also showed that the LMRDA's time
limitations are not always strictly applied, but may be tolled, as where
there has been union obstruction of Labor Department investigations. 12 However, if the approach to be used is to examine whether
the legislative intent would best be served by tolling the statute, then
tolling the statute for union obstructionism is not necessarily a sufficient or compelling answer to the problem of whether the legislative
purpose is equally met by tolling the statute where there has been a
waiver agreement by the union. The important question, therefore, is
whether the Sixth Circuit properly analyzed the history and purposes
of the LMRDA. The court was correct in stating that there were two
principal sympathies present in Congress during the enactment of the
bill-one that the Act was to protect the democratic rights of working
people, and the other that there should be minimum interference with
120. "'In fact, § 402(b) is not even couched in the usual language of a statute of repose;
rather, it is a directive to the Secretary of Labor which, under certain circumstances, he must
follow." Id. at 240, quoted by the court in Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d at I 118.
121. The term "calendar month" could mean anywhere from 28 to 31 days. See note 135
infra. See note 3 supra for the pertinent text of this section.
122. Equitable estoppel and waiver are frequently confused, for they are similar and analyzed alike. The process which occurred in Hodgson is usually termed a waiver, since an express
agreement was made. See 63 HARV. L. REV., supra note 89, at 1223. Equitable considerations
have been used to justify tolling of time limitations in many cases, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E.
Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326
F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964).
123. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
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union operations.1u The Hodgson court concluded, consistently with
the Supreme Court's language in Calhoon v. Harvey,"'6 that the con-

gressional desire for minimum government interference was predominant.'12 Yet the Sixth Circuit failed to give sufficient consideration to
the other principal congressional intent, that of protecting the interests of individual union members. These interests, which may well be
in sharp conflict with those of the international union, or even those

of the Government, were never forcefully asserted in any of the briefs
filed by the parties in the case.",' Certainly, there were many congressional indications of concern for the interests of individual union
members as evidenced by Title I of the LMRDA.15 Moreover, the
House version of the LMRDA originally provided for enforcement of

the election provisions by permitting the aggrieved individual to file
suit"" indicating that the House was interested in protecting the union
125. 440 F.2d at 1117. See also Election Remedies 1623-26; notes 81-82supraand accompanying text.
126. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
127. Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d at 1119. The Sixth Circuit inexplicably failed
to cite to
the Calhoon v. Harvey decision. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1959), reprinted
in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 417. The court also failed
to meet the interesting argument raised
by IPPA that congressional concern for minimal interference in union internal affairs-letting
unions resolve their own disputes whenever possible-was satisfied by the LMRDA section
402(a)(1) exhaustion of internal union remedies requirement. Brief for Appellee at 14, Hodgson
v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971). See Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n,
389 U.S. 463, 472 (1968).
128. The Hodgson court felt that the sixty day time limit was meant to protect the international union. This was the position urged by the Secretary of Labor: "[t]he purpose of the short
time limit of section 402(b) is to resolve union electoral disputes in the shortest possible time,
in order to free the union and the successful candidates from the suspicion of electoral malfeasance as quickly as possible and to enable them to act effectively in behalf of the union membership," Brief for Appellant at 23-24, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d If13 (6th Cir. 1971), the
Secretary, of course, arguing that IPPA could permissibly waive a statutory provision enacted
for its benefit. This position was also urged by the international union in Hodgson: "officers
of a labor organization whose positions were in doubt as a result of a Department of Labor
investigation could not function as effectively or efficiently in dealings with third parties such
as employers who could easily convert the doubtful status of union officers into collective
bargaining delays, contrary to the interests of the members of the labor organization as well as
the overall national labor policy to avoid and minimize situations leading to labor disputes,"
Reply Memorandum for Defendant at 9, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 11,759 (E.D.
Tenn., May 7, 1970), but the international union drew the conclusion that the sixty day time
limit should not be allowed to be waived.
129. See note 19 supra. Since the availability of an individual intra-union election violation
suit under title I has been narrowed by judicial decision, perhaps a stronger argument exists
for preserving some alternate form of protection.
130. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., IstSess. 43 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 801.
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member, as well as the international organization. Interestingly, the

last line of section 402(b) of the LMRDA provides that upon the
Secretary's filing suit "[t]he court shall have power to take such
action as it deems proper to preserve the assets of the labor organization,"' 31 an obvious safeguard for the dues paid by individual members.
The importance of protecting the individual union member in the
context of a Title IV complaint is emphasized by the fact that the
provisions of section 402(b) constitute his sole post-election remedy

outside of internal union procedures.132 The sixty day time limit of
that section can be seen as guaranteeing to complainants prompt

Labor Department consideration, and a speedy resolution of their
grievances. The Secretary's failure to file suit within sixty days, after

having made the required finding of "probable cause," means that
the complainants are subject to an extended period during which the

allegedly improperly elected union officials remain in office,133 perhaps to consolidate their power, making it more difficult to unseat
them should a re-run of the contested election later be held; 3 1 or,

perhaps to utilize the union's treasury or financial holdings for personal gain.

The Sixth Circuit viewed the section 402(b) sixty day time limit
in terms of a conventional statute of limitations whose purpose was,

as the Secretary contended, "to protect potential defendants . . .
[and such] protection . . . is sufficiently insured when the delay in
filing a suit is bottomed upon the defendant's own express consent
....
"13 However, when the congressional concern for the protec131. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).
132. See note 19 supra.
133. Such officials, however, are to be assumed to have been validly elected until final
disposition of the complaint(s) by the Dep't of Labor. LMRDA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)
(1970).
134. Chief Judge James T. Foley of the Northern District of New York, during a hearing
on motions in Shultz v. Local 420, Aluminum Workers Int'l, Civil No. 68-CV-357 (N.D.N.Y.),
remarked that -[u]sually, they have the new election, and the same fellow gets elected, and it is
all over with," quoted in Brief for Appellant at 17a, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th
Cir. 1971).
135. Response of the Secretary of Labor to [District] Court's December 3, 1969 Memoran11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May
dum Opinion and Order at 8, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS.
7, 1970). For a discussion of statutes of limitations see notes 89-96 supra and accompanying
text.
One of the peculiar aspects of the Hodgson case is the somewhat contradictory position
taken by the Dep't of Labor concerning the precision with which the LMRDA's section 402(b)
and 402(a) time limits were to be applied. On one hand the Secretary quoted with approval the
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tion of individual union members is taken into account, the multiple
purposes of section 402(b)'s sixty day time limit become evident.
While, of course, the time limit serves to benefit "the union and its
officers in removing doubts about their authority and reputation,"' 36
it also serves to require the Department of Labor "to give prompt and
expeditious consideration to the merit of the union member's complaint, ' 137 providing the individual member with a speedy remedy
after exhaustion of internal union procedures. Thus, the Hodgson
court's assertion that "the 60-day time limitation which was waived
by appellee [union] was principally intended by Congress as a protection for the very party which executed the waivers,"'' 3 fails to fully
examine whether this statutory time limitation was intended solely to
protect this defendant (international union) and should be waivable
by this defendant acting alone.'
Fourth Circuit's statement declaring "[tihat the Act did not contemplate precision limiting
filing to the exact day is reflected by the 'one calendar month' provision in section 402(b), [sic]
which can mean anything from 28 to 31 days." Brief for Appellant at 9, Hodgson v. IPPA,
440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971), quoting Wirtz v. Peninsula Shipbuilders Ass'n, 382 F.2d 237,
240 n.4 [apparently the Fourth Circuit erred in citing to section 402(b), since 402(a), mentioned
at id. at 239 n.l, contains the "one calendar month" provision]. On the other hand, in response
to the following question:
May an intra-union election violation complaint filed with the Secretary of Labor be refiled in order to reinstate a 60-day time limit?
the Department of Labor stated:
No. Section 402(a) of the LMRDA provides that a union member must file his complaint
with the Secretary 'within one calendar month' after he has exhausted his internal union
remedies. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended this provision to be
mandatory. See Senate Report No. 187, 86th Cong., IstSess. (1959), p. 21, wherein it
is written that 'no complaint may be entertained which is filed more than I month after
the union has denied a remedy or the 3-month period has expired.' Thus, in the situation
you describe, the one calendar month would have expired several weeks prior to the refiling of the complaint and the Secretary would have no authority under section 402(b)
to act on such complaint.
Certainly it would be unusual for Congress to have enacted section 402(a) and 402(b) at the
same time, yet been of two different frames of mind concerning the precision with which the
statutory time limits were to be followed, section 402(a) strictly adhered to, section 402(b)
susceptible to waiver. Furthermore, if one of the two time limits was intended to be less
strictly
adhered to, wouldn't it be more logical to expect it to be the one referred to in the inexact term
"one calendar month," (section 402(a)) instead of the one specified exactly as "sixty days"
(section 402(b))?
136. Brief for Appellant at 24, Hodgson v. I PPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971).
137. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Hodgson v. IPPA, 40 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1971).
138. 440 F.2d at 1119.
139. An area of inquiry beyond the scope of this note concerns the authority, in an agency
law sense, to agree to a waiver of the sixty day time limit. This issue has apparently arisen in
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Even though the Sixth Circuit did not give an adequate expression
of the need to provide protection for individual union members in its
decision sanctioning the section 402(b) waiver process, it is beyond
question that such an administrative procedure for the Department of
Labor is required in some form. In the immediate context of the
Hodgson litigation, without the judicial acceptance of the waiver
agreement, all of the complainants would have been deprived of an
effective remedy through no fault of their own, contrary to the abovementioned congressional policy of protecting the interests of individual union members. Equally compelling is the fact that the Department of Labor's practice of routinely accepting section 402(b) waivers
"has been followed since shortly after the effective date of the Act"; 14 0
a longstanding administrative procedure accorded "considerable
weight" by the Hodgson panel. 4' One of the reasons for this must be
that the Department is understaffed for the numerous responsibilities
assigned to it under the LMRDA, as well as under the other statutes
the past where a president of an international union acted to waive the time limit on behalf of
a local union. See. e.g., Shultz v. Local 420, Aluminum Workers Int'l, Civil No. 68-CV-357
(N.D.N.Y.), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at 5a, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir.
1971); Shultz v. Local 1470, IBEW, Civil No. 44-69 (D.N.J.), reprintedin Brief for Appellant,
supra, at 2a, 34a-36a.
140. Response of the Secretary of Labor to [District] Court's December 3, 1969 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 6, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAs. ' 11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May
7, 1970).
141. 440 F.2d at 1117. It has been observed that the section 402(b) time limit is unworkable
without the flexibility of the waiver procedure. Chief Judge James T. Foley remarked during a
hearing in Shultz v. Local 420, Aluminum Workers Int'l, 74 L.R.R.M. 2281 (N.D.N.Y. 1970),
that Congress' purpose was "not to make a limitation on a period of time, because [sixty days]
would be a very short period," reprinted in Brief for Appellant at 12a, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440
F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 197 1). While the Labor Department has apparently not sought congressional
amendment of section 402(b), it recognizes the impossibility of conforming strictly to its literal
language:
The 60-day period provided in section 402(b) is for the most part sufficiently long enough
to allow the Department to conduct a complete and adequate investigation of a protested
election. In some cases, such as those involving large local unions or large international
unions, the 60-day period has proved to be an obstacle which we have had to overcome.
In the large election cases additional time may be helpful to permit the parties to fully
discuss the investigative findings and for each side to conduct more complete investigations. Hence the Department makes use of waivers when additional time is necessary.
Labor Dep't Response 7 (question 16) (emphasis added).
The international union in Hodgson countered with the argument that any claims of difficulty under section 402(b) should be directed to Congress, which had enacted the sixty day time
period. Reply Memorandum for Defendant at 10-I1, Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS.
' 11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May 7, 1970).
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it administers.' According to the Labor Department, there are about
350 professionals available at the 24 area Labor-Management Services Administration (LMSA) offices to investigate intra-union, and

any other labor, complaints.1 3 During the fiscal year 1971 alone, there
were 132 such election complaints filed. On the basis of prior Department experience, about one-third of these will probably prove to be

actionable,'

meaning about 44 will require more than minimal inves-

tigation. As the Secretary pointed out:
In the case of international union elections. . . the required investigation may
involve many locals. In such cases, a scrupulous and fair investigation may be
lengthy. It simply may not be possible to complete such an inquiry within 60
days. 1

Other reasons underlying the Department of Labor's practice of

accepting waivers of the section 402(b) time limit are its belief that
this more closely conforms to the LMRDA's preference for minimal

judicial interference in labor union matters, as well as the Depart142. For a contrary opinion, see Brief for Appellant at 8a-9a, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d
1113 (6th Cir. 1971), where Mr. Anthony F. Cafferky, counsel for Local 420, Aluminum
Workers Int'l, declared that the FBI is available to participate with the Labor Department in
union election investigations, and that the Department was able to complete its investigation of
the United Mine Workers Union, with 1,219 locals and about 186,000 members, in only 58
days.
143. Labor Dep't Response 3 (question 2). In responding to the questionnaire, the Department stressed that:
It should be noted that the responsibilities of the area offices are not limited solely to
actions taken in connection with the administration of the LMRDA but include all
departmental activities involving the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Section
10(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-365); Section 6(a) of the
Act of 1965 Authorizing Research and Development in High Speed Ground Transportation (P.L. 89-220); and statutes relating to employment rights including Section 9 of
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended; Section 7 of the
Service Extension Act of 1941, as amended; Section 3 of the Army Reserve and Retired
Personnel Service Law of 1940, as amended; and Section 5(a) of the Act of March 31,
1947 (P.L. 80-26). In addition to these statutes the areas offices of LMSA are responsible
for carrying on investigative responsibilities which arise in connection with the administration of Executive Order 11491, as amended by Executive Order 11616. Id.
144. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
145. Brief for Appellant at 25-26 in Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 197 1). It is
interesting to note that, in answer to the question:
In what percentage of the intra-union complaint cases are waiver agreements reached?
the Labor Department responded:
Agreements have been entered into in approximately 30 percent of the election complaint
cases filed with the Secretary of Labor as of January I, 1971. LabOr Dep't Response 8
(question 19) (emphasis added).
Since roughly only about 33 percent of the complaints filed prove to be actionable, this means
that in almost 80percentof these a waiver agreement is reached!
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ment's belief that litigation should be avoided whenever possible. 4
The availability of a waiver allows the Labor Department to conduct
its investigation, or that part of it possible to complete within sixty
days, and to present its findings to the respondent union for consideration. Absent this flexibility, the Secretary has claimed he would be
forced to automatically file an action whenever he reasonably believed
violations had occurred affecting a union election.' 47 With the waiver
of the sixty day time limit, the Secretary has the opportunity to allow
"the union to review the Department of Labor's investigative findings
and to allow the parties to have conferences looking toward the voluntary settlement of the issues involved."' 48 This preference for avoiding
litigation, while grounded for the most part in the congressional policy against undue government interference in internal labor union
affairs,' also has a practical foundation: voluntary compliance almost always provides a faster resolution of complaints than does
litigation. 5 '
146. Joseph A. Yablonski, testifying before the Senate Labor Subcommittee on July 13,
1971, remarked that he didn't "know what phobia fear of litigation is, but the Department [of
Labor] apparently has it."
147. Brief for Appellant at 28 in Hodgson v. I PPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 197 1).
148. Labor Dep't Response 4-5 (question 7).
149. The Secretary interpreted the congressional policy to mean that "Congress has expressed a decided preference for the resolution of the intra-union conflicts by all processes short
of litigation." Brief for Appellant at 24, Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1971).
However, Congress' policy actually "reveals a clear congressional concern for the need to
remedy abuses in union elections without departing needlessly from the longstanding congressional policy against unnecessary governmentalinference with internal union affairs," Hodgson
v. Local 6799, USW, 403 U.S. 333, 338 (1971) (emphasis added), citing, Wirtz v. Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463,470-71 (1968). Obviously, once the Secretary of Labor has entered
into the union election controversy, there is already governmental interference, and one can only
speculate whether congressional aversion to any governmental involvement meant also that
Congress equally strongly preferred for controversies to be handled almost completely within
the Labor Department's own administrative procedures. In any event, there is no question that
the Department of Labor is waiver oriented:
The Department of Labor considers it more appropriate to accept waivers . . . than to
initiate litigation and hold a case pending on the court dockets. By entering into these
agreements we avoid unnecessary litigation and overcrowding of the court dockets while
at the same time we accomplish the statutory purpose of obtaining a new election under
the supervision of the Secretary of Labor which will afford the members of the labor
organizations the free and democratic opportunity to elect the officers of their organization. Labor Dep't Response 5 (question 7).
150. For example, the Hodgson action involved an election on February 21, 1968, for which
suit was filed on October 29, 1968; but it was not until December 3, 1969 that the district court
dismissed without any consideration on the merits. The district court cited the delay in its order
of dismissal: "The Court experienced difficulty in bringing this action into status for disposi-
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Even accepting the need for some form of waiver of the sixty day
time limit of section 402(b) of the LMRDA, there still remains the

problem left unexamined by the Hodgson court of whether the entire
Labor Department waiver procedure should remain as unsupervised

as it is currently. The Department of Labor contends that the Secretary's decision to accept a waiver is not a judicially reviewable administrative determination. 151 The opinion of the district court in De Vito

v. Shultz,5 2 however, suggests that this is still an unsettled area of
administrative/labor law. In DeVito, a petition for mandamus was

sought to require the Secretary of Labor to institute a section 402(b)
suit. While he had made the determination that the LMRDA viola-

tions complained of did, in fact, occur, he also had made the further
determination that the violations were not sufficient to have influenced the union election. Judge Gesell recognizing that it was not for

the court to substitute its discretion for that of an administrative
official, nevertheless rejected the Secretary's contention that judicial
review was entirely inappropriate:
Indeed, the very exclusivity of the remedy serves to emphasize the necessity or
some degree of Court supervision. To rule otherwise would enable the Secretary
to frustrate the will of Congress; it would leave the Secretary's conduct immune
from scrutiny in matters where he is charged with significant responsibilities
that must be carried out if the sweeping congressional directive to infuse basic
principles of democratic free election into union organizations is to be implemented.'
tion." Shultz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS.
11,759, at 21,375 (E.D. Tenn., May 7, 1970).
Almost four years following the contested IPPA election, after denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court, this case is ready to be heard on the merits.
The Labor Dep't indicated that while the petition for certiorari was pending "the parties
entered into a stipulation whereby the Union agreed to conduct its next regular election of
officers under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor. In this election nominations will be
held in December, 1971, and the balloting in February, 1972. The stipulation has been submitted
to the United States District Court for its approval." Labor Dep't Response 2 (question 7).
For a discussion of the problem of delay see Labyrinth 372-80.
151. Labor Dep't Response 6-7 (question 13). The general rules precluding an individual
from intervening in a suit filed by the Department, filing a § 402 suit, or obtaining review of
the Secretary's decision not to file a § 402 suit, support the Labor Dep't's position. See notes
20-25 supra.
152. 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C.), complaint dismissed after remandforfirtheradininistra-

tive proceedings, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682 (D.D.C. 1969).
153. 300 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C. 1969). Judge Gesell found that the letters sent by the
Secretary to the complainants were insufficient to explain why further Labor Department action
was not being taken, and he ordered the Secretary to reopen the matter for further consideration,
and to furnish the court with a more detailed statement of the Department's reasons for its
decision. Id. at 384. When the case was heard again by the district court, Judge Gesell declared
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Another aspect of the judicial reviewability issue is the timing of

when the recourse to the courts would be available. And this, in turn,
would seem to depend upon what the acceptable duration for a waiver

agreement, including extensions, is to be. In the Hodgson case, two
separate extensions of the time limit were agreed upon, for a total of
120 additional days beyond the apparent statutory deadline. In the
"obstruction-of-investigation" cases, the approach has been to subtract the period of union-caused delay from the time between the

submission of a complaint to the Secretary and his filing of a civil
action; if the result is sixty days or less, the suit is held to be timely.' 5'

Generally, in statute of limitations cases where the time limit is held
to be tolled by equitable defenses, the prevailing standard allows ex-

tensions for a "reasonable time."' 55 The Department of Labor has

expressed the opinion that any waiver "should in all cases be limited
to that period of time deemed necessary to correct violations which

were uncovered in the challenged election."' 5 An alternative restricthat the Secretary "has . . . satisfied the Court that there is a rational basis for his not
proceeding." 72 L.R.R.M. 2682, 2683 (D.D.C. 1969). What further materials were in fact
submitted to the court by the Department of Labor is not clear; and, indeed, there is a suggestion
from the statement by Judge Gesell that it would have been "impossible for Secretary Shultz
to explain the actions of Secretary Wirtz." Id. at 2683.
154. Wirtz v. Local 47, Int'l Masters, Mates and Pilots, 240 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
155. Munter v. Lankford, 232 F.2d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
156. Labor Dep't Response 5 (question 8). The current administrative practice, however, is
usually to accept waivers for a standard period of thirty days, with an additional extension of
thirty days if necessary, and at least one waiver agreement was accepted for a period of at least
18 months. Id. at 4-5 (question 7). Moreover, the Department will accept a waiver of the section
402(b) time limit despite its having discovered sufficient evidence to justify a finding of probable
cause.
In response to the question: "Does the Secretary of Labor agree to a waiver after he has
determined that probable cause exists that an intra-union election violation has occurred?" the
Department stated:
A waiver would be accepted if the labor organization agrees (a) to conduct a new election
of officers under the supervision of the Department of Labor or (b) to take such other
action as the Department deems appropriate to remedy the violations which occurred
during the challenged election. Labor Dep't Response 4 (question 6).
With respect to the Hodgson case, the Department said:
In this case it was determined shortly after the investigation was completed that violations had occurred which may have affected the outcome of the challenged election. After
the investigative results were analyzed and the Union was advised of our findings several
conferences were held looking toward voluntary corrective action by the Union. Shortly
before the expiration of the 120 day period it became evident that the violations would
not be remedied. At this point the Secretary's duly designated representative-the Solicitor of Labor-made the finding of probable cause required by the statute and authorized
the filing of a civil action to set aside the challenged election of officers. Labor Dep't
Response 2 (question 5).
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tion upon the duration of waiver agreements is suggested by the Secretary's assertion that "[w]ithout the device of the time waiver, the
Secretary would have no recourse if the union reneged on the settlement agreement." 157 This raises the possibility that waivers could be
judicially restricted to situations where a bona fide agreement with the
respondent union has been obtained by the Secretary; the section
402(b) sixty day time limit then being tolled should the union renege
on its promise to effect a suitable remedy. This would have the benefit
of requiring the Secretary of Labor to proceed expeditiously toward
a settlement prior to the expiration of the sixty day time limit, while
providing him, should he refrain from filing suit, with protection
against a union's breaking its promises to remedy any LMRDA violations.
The question of when, if at all, a complainant may seek judicial
review of a waiver agreement-after the section 402(b) sixty day period has passed; after the sixty days had passed and the Secretary had
failed to obtain a compliance agreement from the union; after the
expiration of the first extension period; or after the expiration of a
"reasonable waiver period"-still remains; but any solution to this
problem must necessarily include an inquiry into the complainant's
role in Department of Labor section 402(b) waiver procedures. At
present, complainants are generally not participants in discussions
preliminary to a waiver agreement, since they are not considered
parties to such a waiver. 5 ' Nor are complainants generally even informed of waiver agreements, the Department of Labor only notifying
them upon a final determination of the complaint, and sometimes not
even then:' 59
157. Response of the Secretary of Labor to [District] Court's December 3, 1969 Memoran-

dum Opinion and Order at 7, Wirtz v. IPPA, 65 CCH LAB. CAS.

11,759 (E.D. Tenn., May

7, 1970).
158. Labor Dep't Response 6 (question 11).
159. In his statement of July 13, 197 1,before the Senate Labor Subcommittee, Mr. Joseph
A. Yablonski, discussing complaints filed with the Secretary of Labor concerning the 1969
UMWA Int'l election, asserted that:
For ninety days we remained completely in the dark as to whether the Department had
found merit in our challenge or not.
Thus, had we never made inquiry, we would never have known what was happening.
It is standard operating procedure within the Department not even to inform the complaining party that the Department is going to court. This was true concerning the 1969
election. We never even received a letter from the Secretary of Labor advising us that
suit would be filed.
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As a general rule complainants are not advised of the fact that the Department
has accepted a waiver of the statutory time period within which suit must be
Filed. Such persons will be made aware of the waiver agreements if they contact
the LMSA Area Office or the National Office of LMWP regarding the status
of their complaint to the Department. 160

Obviously, an individual union member who desired to contest the
Secretary's decision to agree to a waiver of the section 402(b) time
limit would be handicapped by his lack of knowledge of the circumstances of the waiver agreement. A better approach for the Department of Labor would be to adopt procedures similar to those of the
EEOC, permitting, at any time after ninety days from the filing of
the complaint, either a complainant or a respondent to request that a
determination letter from the Commission be sent.'
Hodgson v. IPPA seriously undermines the viability of the sixty
day time limit imposed by section 402(b) of the LMRDA. The court,
in acquiescing to a longstanding administrative practice of the Department of Labor, prevented the immediate need for an amendment
to the Act, which might have been difficult for Congress to wrestle
with. But in attempting to construe the language of section 402(b) of
the LMRDA in conformity with both the congressional purpose behind its enactment, and the manner in which the section has been
administered by the Secretary of Labor, the Sixth Circuit uncovered
many knotty issues, including the duration and scope of the waivers
to be allowed, and the role of the individual complainants in the
Labor Department's waiver process.
160. Labor Dep't Response 6 (question 9).
161. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.

